Photo of Mark M. Murakami

Mark Murakami practices in the firm’s Appeals, Business & Commercial Law, Construction Law, Land Use & Eminent Domain, Litigation & Dispute Resolution, Real Estate, and Wills, Trusts & Estates practice groups. His focus is on complex commercial disputes, land use negotiation and litigation, environmental, and general civil litigation. He has appeared in all federal and states courts in Hawaii, most of the administrative boards and commissions, and is licensed in the U.S. Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Court of Federal Claims. He is rated “BV” by Martindale-Hubbell, receiving a rating of 4.4/5.0.

Mark is the 2025 President of the Hawaii State Bar Association (HSBA). Hawaii’s attorneys selected Mark for this leadership role in a statewide election in late 2022. He subsequently served as the 2023 Vice President and 2024 President-Elect. Founded in 1899, the HSBA is a mandatory professional organization for active and inactive licensed attorneys in Hawai. Its mission is to unite and inspire Hawaii’s lawyers to promote justice, serve the public and improve the legal profession. Mark was first elected by his peers to the 21-person HSBA Board in 2012 and was elected Treasurer from 2014 to 2017.

Mark has been appointed to a leadership position in the American Bar Association Section of Litigation. He will serve as Co-Chair for the Real Estate, Condemnation & Trust Litigation Committee and will be responsible for programming and publications for the nationwide membership.

Mark has been elected as the Hawaii member of Owners’ Counsel of America (OCA), an exclusive association of the nation’s leading eminent domain lawyers. Eminent domain is the legal process by which the government acquires private property for public uses, most often by forcing the owner to sell it. Membership in OCA is by invitation-only, and limited to a single member in each state. Members are selected for their experience and dedication in defending the constitutional rights of private property owners in eminent domain, inverse condemnation, regulatory takings, and other property rights matters.

Mark was elected a Fellow of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers (ACREL). Admission to the College is by invitation only to lawyers who are distinguished real estate practitioners and who have contributed to the improvement of real estate law through a combination of speaking, writing, teaching, and serving on relevant boards and commissions. Founded in 1978, the College is comprised of more than 1,000 lawyers distinguished for their skill, experience, and high standards of professional and ethical conduct in the practice of real estate law.

Mark was awarded the CRE (Counselor of Real Estate) credential by The Counselors of Real Estate, an international association of experienced real estate practitioners including appraisers, lawyers, and brokers, who provide expert advisory services to clients on complex real property and land-related matters. Membership in The Counselors of Real Estate is selective and is extended by invitation only, attesting to the practitioner’s expertise and proven competence in his or her chosen area of real estate.

Mark once again was selected by his peers for inclusion in the 2025 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America® for his work in Commercial Litigation, Eminent Domain & Condemnation Law, Land Use & Zoning Law, Litigation-Land Use & Zoning, Real Estate Law, Trusts & Estates, Litigation-Real Estate, and Litigation-Trusts & Estates. He was also named the Best Lawyers® 2013 Lawyer of the Year Eminent Domain & Condemnation Law. Mark has been selected by Super Lawyers for over 10 years.

Mark was the Valedictorian of the Class of 1999 from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, William S. Richardson School of Law where he served as Articles Editor of the University of Hawaii Law Review. He has received numerous academic awards, including: Dean’s Scholar, Porter Scholastic Award (2 times); Awards for highest grade in Property I, Torts I, Contracts I, Corporations, and Professional Responsibility; Kono Award for Academic Achievement; Phi Delta Phi Professional Responsibility Award; HSBA Real Property and Financial Services Section Award.

He is also a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. He served for 13 years on active duty before joining the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve in 2005. During his time on active duty, he served on three different Coast Guard cutters, including command of a patrol boat in California. He spent four years assigned to the Fourteenth Coast Guard District Legal Office, prosecuting courts-martial, litigating cases in federal court as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, and advising Coast Guard officials on maritime, criminal, environmental and international law issues.

Mark has been awarded the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, two Meritorious Service Medals, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, two Coast Guard Commendation Medals and four Coast Guard Achievement Medals. He retired in July 2022 as a Captain, culminating thirty years of active duty and reserve commissioned service.

To view his blog on federal litigation and maritime law, in and around Hawaii and Oceania, please visit: www.hawaiioceanlaw.com.

Mark was born on Maui and raised in Kailua, Oahu. He is a graduate of Kailua High School and was active in the Castle Performing Arts Center.

On Tuesday, President Obama issued an Executive Order relating to the Somalia piracy situation.  The Executive Order took effect immediately.  It purports to “block” payments, transfers or donations of property to several classes of individuals related to the crisis in Somalia.

The text of the Executive Order, the concurrently released message to Congress and the Annex are provided below.  When reviewing the legality of such an Executive Order, the starting point is to identify the statutory authorization for such an action.  As President Truman found out during the Korean War, the Executive Branch of the federal government is constitutionally constrained by its inability to legislate and any actions which purport to legislate are unconstitutional.  See Steel Seizure Case.

In this case, as you would expect, the President does have wide authority in the realm of international financial transactions and national defense.  See 50 U.S.C. s. 1702.  The maritime community is abuzz about this E.O. (hat tip to the Maritime Law Association of the U.S. for sending me the attached documents). Stay tuned.

The E.O. states:

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the deterioration of the security situation and the persistence of violence in Somalia, and acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, which have repeatedly been the subject of United Nations Security Council resolutions (including Resolution 1844 of November 20, 2008; Resolution 1846 of December 2, 2008; Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008; and Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009), and violations of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 733 of January 23, 1992, and elaborated upon and amended by subsequent resolutions (including Resolution 1356 of June 19, 2001; Resolution 1725 of December 6, 2006; Resolution 1744 of February 20, 2007; Resolution 1772 of August 20, 2007; Resolution 1816 of June 2, 2008; and Resolution 1872 of May 26, 2009), constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, including any overseas branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;

and

(ii) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

(A) to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including

but not limited to:

(1) acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political process; or

(2) acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or other international peacekeeping operations related to Somalia;

(B) to have obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

(C) to have directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to Somalia, or to have been the recipient in the territory of Somalia of, arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to military activities;

(D) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the activities described in subsections (a)(ii)(A), (a)(ii)(B), or (a)(ii)(C) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or

(E) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

(b) I hereby determine that, among other threats to the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. (c) I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the type of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (a) of this section.

(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section include but are not limited to:

(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and

(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

(e) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;

(d) the term “Transitional Federal Institutions” means the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic adopted in February 2004 and the Somali federal institutions established pursuant to such charter, and includes their agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities; and

(e) the term “African Union Mission in Somalia” means the mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1744 of February 20, 2007, and reauthorized in subsequent resolutions, and includes its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.

Sec. 4. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1(a) of this order.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the UNPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit the recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to determine that circumstances no longer warrant the blocking of the property and interests in property of a person listed in the Annex to this order, and to take necessary action to give effect to that determination.

Sec. 8. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 9. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 13, 2010.

BARACK OBAMA

The White House issued a message to Congress re Somalia regarding this Executive Order and also published the Annex with the names of the individuals now “blocked.”

This is an interesting case that has been comprehensively covered by my partner, Robert Thomas, on his blog, www.inversecondemnation.com.  But, it is an important shoreline precedent and deserves mention here.

Simply put, can a shoreline property owner be liable, under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. s. 401, when structures that were lawful when constructed become unlawful (in trespass) through a property boundary that shifted shoreward through erosion? The Ninth Circuit opinion which answered that question, YES, is here.  The case is Sharp v. United States and this petition for Supreme Court review is certainly one to watch.

By way of factual background, aWashington shorefront property owner had erected a “shoreline defense structure” on then-dry land.  The land near the structure eroded and the structure then jutted out into now-tidelands.  Those tidelands were owned by the Lummi Indian Nation who, joined by the federal government, sued the property owner for trespass.

This case is the logical follow-on to another Rivers and Harbors case, United States v. Alameda Gateway, Ltd. 213 F.3d 1161 (2000)[Note: Robert rep’d landowner in that case].  In that case, the Ninth Circuit held:

Although § 10 does not explicitly mention the maintenance of structures in navigable waters, in the sense of keeping structures in place, we have interpreted the RHA as making unlawful the failure to remove structures prohibited by § 10, even if they were previously legal.

The problem with Alameda Gateway is that the statute prohibits the “creation of any obstruction” and “build or commence the building of any …bulkhead, jetty or other structure.”  44 U.S.C. s. 403.  The statute doesn’t say anything about failing to remove structures.

Lots here.  Still digesting, stay tuned for more posts.

 

New admiralty case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  Side note:  Justice David Souter participated in this panel by designation, following Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s pattern of an active retirement.

This is a case about maritime lien asserted by a subcontractor whose materials were eventually installed on a vessel. The court did not allow the lien to

New admiralty case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Maritime attachment has certainly been in the news these days.  Well, in the admiralty news world anyway.  This case sets out the standard for vacating attachment, in an interesting (slow news day) case involving oil pipelines, unpaid divers, and Mexican District Attorneys.  The case is 

I am on the redeye to Los Angeles tonight, but wanted to get this news release posted.  Apparently, there has been some concerns about starting and finishing canoe regattas in the various harbors and the Coast Guard and State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources are crafting policy to address the issue.

The

New Longshore case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The case is Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Fields  and can be found here.

This case turns on the employer’s burden of proof to rebut the work connection to an injury:

Section 20(a) of the LHWCA provides that certain disabilities are presumed to be work-related “in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.” 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). Relying on that provision, the Benefits Review Board affirmed an award of disability benefits for respondent Clair Maynard Fields.

Fields’s employer Bath Iron Works (“BIW”), a ship manufacturing facility based in Bath, Maine, now petitions for review of the Board’s decision, arguing that it produced “substantial evidence” to rebut the statutory presumption and, alternatively, that the Board exceeded the scope of its authority in vacating an earlier decision of the ALJ that rejected Fields’s claim for benefits. We disagree on both points and therefore deny the petition.

The opinion is fact heavy, but it does show that the presumption is a potent tool in claimant’s arsenal.

New admiralty case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals on fishing wage agreements.  The opinion in the case of Borkowski v. F/V Madison Kate, can be found here.

From the Court’s introduction:

The appellants in this maritime matter are three commercial fishermen who served aboard the F/V Madison Kate on a fishing voyage from Stonington, Connecticut in March 2006. Contrary to the requirements of federal maritime law, there was no written agreement memorializing the terms of appellants’ employment. Upon return to port, each of the fishermen and the other crew members was paid a portion of the boat’s net proceeds, consisting of the value of the trip’s catch, less various expenses and the owner’s share. Their payments were made pursuant to what the fishing industry is known in the fishing industry as the “lay-share system,” under which the net proceeds are divided up into “shares” that are then awarded, in whole or part, to crew members depending on, among other things, their experience and performance. Appellants Wood and Borkowski each received a full share; appellant Ayres received a three-quarter share. The fishermen sued, claiming violations of federal maritime law and state wage laws. After an abbreviated bench trial, the district court awarded Ayres an additional quarter-share; Wood and Borkowski received no damage award. The fishermen claim on appeal that the district court committed legal error in limiting their damages. Such written agreements must contain the period of their effectiveness, the terms of any wage, share or other compensation arrangement, and any other agreed terms. Although we employ somewhat different reasoning than did the district court, we affirm the judgment.

At issue in this case was what damages are available for violations of the fishing wage agreement statute, 46 U.S.C. 10601.  Rather than address the crewmens’ arguments regarding the availability of compensatory damages for violations of that statute, the appeals court highlighted their lack of evidence (apart from counsel’s “say-so”) of damage or the details of the deductions taken from the fishing vessel’s gross revenue from the trip.  Such a lack of evidence was fatal to the claim.

The Advertiser ran a story this morning on a bill pending in the Legislature regarding the definition of the boundary between oceanfront landowners and the public.  Article here.

I pulled the bill and it is reprinted below:

RELATING TO COASTAL AREAS.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII:

SECTION 1. Section 205A-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended by amending the definition of “shoreline” to read as follows:

“Shoreline” means the upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than storm and seismic waves, at high tide during the season of the year in which the highest wash of the waves occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of natural vegetation growth, or the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves[-], whichever is further most mauka, but never lower than the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.”

SECTION 2. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed and stricken. New statutory material is underscored.

SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on July 1, 2050.

You can download here.  It is pretty sparse and appears to be a placeholder for further legislative action. 

Stay tuned.

This month, the Supreme Court is hearing a case that deals with the interplay between maritime contracts dealing with cargo shipments and the rules governing disputes for cargo transported on railways.  It is a thorny mix of federal law, international conventions and contract principles. My earlier post here.

The Question Presented is:

Whether the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which governs certain rail and motor transportation by common carriers within the United States, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706 (rail carriers) & 14706 (motor carriers), applies to the inland rail leg of an intermodal shipment from overseas where the shipment was made under a "through" bill of lading issued by an ocean carrier that extended the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 Note, to the inland leg, there was no domestic bill of lading for rail transportation, and the ocean carrier privately subcontracted for rail transportation. 

Merits Briefs (Courtesy of the ABA):

Brief for Petitioner Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Brief for Petition Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.

Brief for Respondent Regal-Beliot Corp.

Amicus Briefs (Courtesy of the ABA):

Brief for the USA in Support of Petitioners

Association of American Railroads brief in Support of Petitioners

Brief for the International Group of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs, et al., in Support of Petitioners

Brief for the World Shipping Council in Support of Petitioners

Brief for the Transportation and Logistics Council and the American Institute of Marine Underwriters in Support of Respondent

We will keep you posted.